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Introduction
while univenture ecosystems present an 
exciting vision for economic development, 
policy and practice should be grounded in 
reality. the truth is that a limited number 
of hyper-successful university spin-outs 
hide real challenges and mediocre economic 
outcomes. there is, in fact, limited evidence 
to support university venturing as a critical 
driver of technology-based economic 
development. Beyond outlier successes at 
a handful of institutions — most notably 
stanford and mIt/Harvard — the link 
between university innovation and economic 
development is tenuous. In the u.s., us$65 
billion of annual university r&D leads 
to fewer than 1,000 new companies each 
year. Outliers such as Google (stanford), 
tomotherapy (wisconsin), wolfson 
microelectronics (edinburgh), and momenta 
Pharmaceuticals (mIt) overshadow the 
majority of university ventures that fail. 
the success stories of venture and 
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) are 
inspirational but present a biased and 
potentially counterproductive lens for 
understanding ecosystems. successes 
build capacity, but failures drive market-
centric learning and innovation. to date, 
guidance for nurturing university venturing 
ecosystems has tried to avoid the hard truths 
about ecosystem dynamics and the value 
of failure. Globally, the average university 
ttO does not generate positive returns from 
licensing or spin-out activity. spin-outs are 
sexy, and successful academic entrepreneurs 
are heroes, but big successes are rare. from 
1990-2005, two spin-outs generated 80% 
of stanford’s returns from all of its equity 
licensing activity. In the long-run, building 
sustainable technology ecosystems at the 
university-industry (u-I) boundary requires 
a different perspective.
there are numerous policy puzzles in 
nurturing entrepreneurial ecosystems based 
on university venturing. for example, prior 
research shows that university spin-outs 
take longer to “graduate” from incubators 
than other technology ventures. ttO 
policies designed to protect intellectual 
property, such as tight control over licensing 
processes, can limit knowledge exchange 
and spillovers. efforts to copy successful 
ecosystem policies have relatively poor 
track records; most university venturing 
ecosystems have not generated widespread 
economic benefits. Using the backdrop 
of the regenerative medicine (regenmed) 
sector, focused on stem cell technologies, 
we examine these puzzles. we propose 
solutions, including specific tactical choices 
and options available to university and 
government policymakers.
1. University Venturing in 
Regenerative Medicine
Prior studies of venture formation, funding 
activity, and economic impact have focused 
primarily on ecosystem growth factors. Here, 
we explore the drivers of entrepreneurial 
choice and behavior that explain why 
ecosystems evolve in specific ways. Focusing 
on regenmed, which is dominated by 
university-led research activity, highlights 
the unique circumstances of ecosystems at 
the u-I boundary.
to examine entrepreneurial ecosystems at 
the u-I boundary we studied three nascent 
regenmed ecosystems. the university of 
wisconsin-madison (madison, u.s.) is a 
global leader in stem cell research, home 
to Professor James Thomson who first 
isolated primate and human stem cells. the 
university of edinburgh (scotland, u.K.) has 
regenmed research history dating to Dolly 
the Sheep and is a top five European medical 
research institution. the skolkovo Institute 
of science and technology (moscow, russia) 
is a new model for an innovation-centric 
university at the heart of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, created in partnership with mIt.
Over a three-year period, we conducted 
dozens of in-depth interviews with regenmed 
entrepreneurs, stem cell company executives, 
academic scientists, and the managers 
of regional venturing support to provide 
rich snapshots of the real-world venturing 
context at the u-I boundary. we developed 
characteristic profiles to understand the 
role and influence of each university on the 
successes build capacity, but 
failures drive market-centric 
learning and innovation
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the rise of University venturing in 
regenerative Medicine
stem cell-based regenerative medicine 
(regenmed) is defined as the “process of 
creating living, functional tissues to repair 
or replace tissue or organ function lost 
due to age, disease, damage or congenital 
defects” (nIH, 2006). stem cells are 
undifferentiated cells that can be induced 
to become tissue or organ-specific cells. 
they can be categorized into three main 
groups: tissue stem cells, embryonic stem 
cells (esCs), and induced pluripotent stem 
cells (iPsCs).
estimates suggest that total stem cell 
research and market activity will exceed 
us$100 billion by 2020. from 2008-2011, 
there were 3,134 published and 777 
granted patents having wO, us, eP and 
GB designations. Japan was the top for 
published patents, with the u.s. leading 
in granted stem cell patents. Billions of 
dollars are being invested in research and 
development amidst shifting government 
policies, complex lawsuits, and uncertain 
regulatory requirements.  
Corporate r&D in regenmed, however, is 
dwarfed by public sector investing. In the 
u.s., the nIH spends approximately us$1.5 
billion/year on regenmed, primarily through 
university research. not surprisingly, 
most stem cell innovations are linked to 
long-term university research programs. 
entrepreneurial activity in regenmed is 
highly concentrated in small ecosystems 
centered on academic institutions. 
uncertainty about commercially viable 
stem cell business models has focused 
investment in technology innovation rather 
than experienced teams and manufacturing 
scale-up. this has encouraged academic 
entrepreneurs to launch companies, but 
hints at high rates of failure for stem cell 
ventures. the alliance for regenerative 
Medicine (ARM) identified more than 700 
regenmed companies operating around the 
world, most with direct ties to universities, 
and more than us$2 billion in private and 
public equity funding invested. 
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evolution of the broader system, and we 
explored the key issues, assumptions, and 
behavioral drivers operating within the 
ecosystems. 
2. Solving Univenture Puzzles
we suggest a different vision for the role of 
ttOs and government agencies hoping to 
foster entrepreneurial ecosystems based 
on university venturing. we identify and 
discuss solutions to four policy “puzzles” 
that challenge the conventional wisdom 
around entrepreneurial ecosystems at the u-I 
boundary. 
Puzzle solution 1: Support the ecosystem 
first, the innovation last
universities often shelter nascent 
innovations and ventures, “protecting” them 
from market forces. Preventing premature 
disclosure to safeguard patent prosecution 
is fully justified. Shielding innovations 
from market feedback, however, can only 
increase the probability of a product-
market mismatch. Innovations licensed 
from universities fail three to four times 
more often than innovations licensed 
from corporations. In general, university 
technology innovations cannot be effectively 
evaluated for commercial success because 
they are too early and have not been tested 
against customer and market needs.
One of the most telling misconceptions about 
university venture ecosystems blames slow 
development on a lack of venture capital 
for early-stage and growth funding. the 
irony is that spin-outs that obtain venture 
capital are more likely to be acquired and 
leave the ecosystem, often drawing the ire 
of university and regional policymakers. 
venture capitalists are often blamed for 
indirectly “culling” out ventures with low 
probability of success, even though this is 
precisely what keeps the ecosystem vibrant. 
in general, university 
technology innovations cannot 
be effectively evaluated for 
commercial success
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stage of development Growth early embryonic
university research us$1.2 billion us$458 million <us$180 million
university medical 
research
>us$300 million ~us$175 million <us$25 million
ttO activity ttO founded in 1928.
2,300 patents granted.
us$57.7 million license 
income in 2011. Currently 
380+ commercial license 
agreements. 280+ start-ups 
since founding.
ttO founded in 1969.
423 patents filed 2007-
2012. us$5.6 million 
license income in 2011. 
as of Q2 2016, 160+ 
commercial license 
agreements. 171 start-ups 
since founding.
ttO founded in 2013. 
Limited activity to date.
2012 vC investment us$25 million us$42 million >us$318 million
strengths entrepreneurial 
university culture; key 
success stories (e.g. CDI); 
problem-based coping 
strategies; very large 
medical research base
extensive government 
support; large medical 
research base; biopharma 
collaborations
relationship with mIt; 
entrepreneurial culture 
designed from within; 
significant risk capital 
pool
weaknesses CDI acquired by fuji; 
tightly controlled IP 
regime; somewhat limited 
risk capital pool; over-
emphasis on supporting 
early-stage innovations
Limited entrepreneurial 
culture; few success 
stories; very limited risk 
capital pool; emotion-
based coping strategy; 
ePIs program terminated
Overdependence on mIt 












university culture and 
ecosystem infrastructure
Customized tech transfer 
and venturing policies 
specific to russian 
industry strengths
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In natural ecosystems, rapid cycle rates 
increase the rate of adaptation. the same 
is true for industries: fast failure cycles 
increase the rate of innovation. equally 
important, entity types are not equally 
distributed among growing and sustainable 
ecosystems. In a technology-based 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, innovations 
and entrepreneurs are significantly more 
common than ventures, collaborator firms, 
and financiers. 
figure 1 shows the reality of “university 
ventures” in the broader entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. In general, universities and ttOs 
should emphasize the role of the ecosystem 
in evaluating the commercial potential of 
innovations and facilitate market-based 
feedback and investment. Promoting specific 
innovations effectively encourages short-
term, high-risk investments. universities 
and policymakers should encourage and 
subsidize relationships and collaboration 
within and across the ecosystem. this is 
an investment well-aligned with the long-
term mission and capability of research 
universities. 
But even aligning university venturing 
ecosystem participants is no easy task. 
Participants, especially government entities 
and university administrations, may 
default to common ground on ecosystem 
inputs without clear outcome metrics or 
accountability. In regenmed, which combines 
significant infrastructure requirements and 
high uncertainty, it is significantly easier for 
participants to agree on physical rather than 
intangible investments. 
In wisconsin, scotland, and moscow, 
collaboration between the university and 
government led to large investments in 
special-purpose stem cell research facilities, 
theoretically to promote translational work 
and reduce the time from “bench-to-bedside.” 
the wisconsin Institute for Discovery, 
scottish Centre for regenerative medicine, 
and skoltech Center for stem Cell research 
all represent large-scale investments to 
we observed two distinct 
categories of entrepreneur 
based upon coping strategies
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facilitate world-class research, advance stem 
cell and regenmed science, and encourage 
entrepreneurial activity. the value of 
these investments has been difficult to 
demonstrate, in part because the facilities 
have primarily served as extensions of 
existing research programs. rather than help 
build the entrepreneurial ecosystems, these 
investments primarily extend the research 
base of their respective universities. they are 
a step in the right direction, but support the 
university more than the ecosystem.
figure 1: university ventures in an entrepreneurial ecosystem
Source: Author analysis
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Puzzle solution 2: Encourage entrepreneurs 
— but equip them for failure
entrepreneurs operating at the u-I boundary 
face the maximum of uncertainty with the 
minimum of resources. In regenmed, where 
legal and regulatory frameworks have yet 
to be fully standardized, this challenge is 
heightened. In our study, we observed two 
distinct categories of entrepreneur based 
upon coping strategies. emotion-based 
entrepreneurs ignore or avoid uncertainties 
while problem-based entrepreneurs address 
uncertainties in a step-wise fashion. 
an emotion-based coping strategy can 
be effective in the short-term because it 
facilitates decision-making over paralysis. 
viewed through the ecosystem lens, 
however, it is counterproductive, because 
it encourages entrepreneurs to revert to 
personal affinities and preferences. Emotion-
based entrepreneurs are more likely to lead 
low-growth lifestyle businesses or even 
so-called “zombie” companies that lock up 
ecosystem resources rather than accept that 
an invention has failed in the market.
the good news is that our research 
highlighted the core cultural environment 
of the parent university to strongly influence 
the coping strategy of entrepreneurs 
operating at the u-I boundary, especially 
university ventures. when the university 
has promoted an entrepreneurial culture, 
spin-out founders and other ecosystem 
participants were more likely to use problem-
based coping strategies. these entrepreneurs 
are both resilient and adaptive, increasing 
the net entrepreneurial capacity of the 
ecosystem.
the bad news is more complicated. 
Propagating entrepreneurial culture 
throughout a large, research-based 
institution is an enormous challenge. ruth 
Graham’s ecosystem study (see further 
resources) addresses this in powerful detail. 
However, the real challenge goes beyond 
new university ventures 
are especially dependent 
on partnerships and 
collaborations
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encouraging an entrepreneurial mindset. 
university and government policymakers 
must accept the importance of venture 
failure. 
failure is a necessary and valuable process. 
fast rates of failure accelerate adaptation and 
innovation, and prevent critical resources 
(human, technological, and financial) 
from being locked up in ventures with low 
potential. Instilling a tolerance for failure, 
specifically fast failure, into the institution 
and the ecosystem requires at least two 
policy changes: 
• first, ttOs and universities should 
openly acknowledge failed innovations 
and ventures rather than hide them. 
they should focus metrics of success on 
the research side of the r&D equation: 
disclosures, patent applications, issued 
patents, licenses, and spin-outs. while 
celebrating successful licenses and spin-
outs is entirely appropriate, ttOs need to 
find ways to celebrate failure as well. 
• second, universities’ entrepreneurial 
“training” programs tend to emphasize 
basic business skill-building rather than 
decision-making and coping strategies. 
Core business skills certainly do not 
hurt entrepreneurs, but are the easiest 
to hire from the ecosystem. By contrast, 
scarce capabilities include engagement 
with the market, decision-making under 
uncertainty, and coping with failure. 
In other words, universities should 
teach entrepreneurship and promote an 
entrepreneurial culture to enable success, 
but someone needs to train inventors and 
early-stage entrepreneurs to embrace 
failure. such training must be primarily 
experiential rather than classroom-
based. 
Puzzle solution 3: Promote knowledge ex-
change across boundaries
successful ecosystems rely on the ebb and 
flow of people, resources, and information 
across ecosystem boundaries. Institutions 
and clusters with closed boundaries risk 
becoming islands of ignorance, systems 
of self-reinforcing misinformation about 
market needs and scale-up requirements. 
new university ventures are especially 
dependent on partnerships and 
collaborations. the specialized knowledge 
requirements at these ventures limits 
internal bandwidth for market-facing 
activities; university ventures need 
reciprocal knowledge-sharing relationships 
to match innovation characteristics to 
specific customer needs.
In our study, we found that emotion-based 
coping strategies were associated with lower 
levels of knowledge exchange. this links 
poor entrepreneurial culture at the parent 
university to ineffective knowledge exchange 
in the ecosystem. this is a self-reinforcing 
cycle where tightly-held technologies and 
ideas do not get real-world feedback until 
it is too late. academic entrepreneurs are 
often enamored with their innovations and 
unwilling to seek out, or accept, guidance 
on commercialization. new university 
ventures often avoid knowledge exchange 
out of fear that a collaborator could become a 
competitor. ttOs sometimes unintentionally 
inhibit knowledge exchange with restrictive 
licensing terms. 
Knowledge exchange is the process for 
enabling knowledge spillovers, a key 
economic growth driver in the triple 
Helix model linking academia, industry, 
and government. a broken triple Helix 
fails to capture the economic outcomes of 
innovation. ttOs should set the example 
by building and maintaining relationships 
with industry participants to vet and test 
innovations, creating early exposure to 
market needs and forces. for example, 
“Catalyst” groups at the wisconsin alumni 
research foundation (warf) and mIt’s 
Deshpande Center provide a mechanism 
for connecting inventions and inventors 
with experienced executives. Catalysts 
review patenting activity and recent 
inventions, providing real-time feedback to 
both the ttO and inventors about market 
trends, partnering opportunities, and 
nascent customer needs. universities and 
local economic development entities can 
edinburgh’s pre-incubator 
scheme was successful 
because it did not attempt to 
fill the missing gaps in the 
ecosystem
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encourage knowledge exchange through a 
variety of activities, including events that 
bring together disparate participants in the 
ecosystem. 
Puzzle solution 4: Customize and align 
rather than copy
Perhaps the greatest challenge in nurturing 
nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems is 
avoiding the pressure to copy practices 
from mature ecosystems. “Best practices” in 
ecosystem analysis is a misnomer because 
ecosystems are not, at the core, directly 
comparable. while policymakers have 
encouraged successful entrepreneurial 
ecosystems to be copied, our research 
suggests that this strategy is fundamentally 
flawed. Suggesting, for example, that the 
entrepreneurial regenmed ecosystem in 
madison, wisconsin, is simply at an earlier 
stage than the ecosystem around stanford 
misses the point. there is probably no 
reasonable scenario in which the madison 
ecosystem “evolves” into the stanford 
ecosystem because of the vast differences 
between their respective industrial, 
geographic, and economic contexts.
the edinburgh-stanford Link provided clear 
evidence for this. the effort, funded by the 
scottish government, attempted to replicate 
stanford’s entrepreneurial culture and 
technology venturing activity. numerous 
silicon valley ecosystem participants were 
brought to the university of edinburgh 
to “transplant” the stanford ecosystem to 
edinburgh, one of the top computer science 
programs in europe. But the edinburgh 
ecosystem was incomplete: it possessed few 
professional managers in the information 
technology sector, extremely limited growth 
capital, and few extant collaborator firms 
or acquirers. when the funding ended, the 
program had few tangible outcomes. 
By contrast, the edinburgh Pre-Incubator 
scheme (ePIs) was well-suited to the nascent 
nature of the university of edinburgh 
venture ecosystem. at the time, edinburgh’s 
ecosystem had few sophisticated resources 
for entrepreneurs, a very limited population 
of managers with technology-based growth 
ventures expertise, and very limited venture 
capital. ePIs was successful because it did 
not attempt to fill the missing gaps in the 
ecosystem. the program provided more than 
300 “assists” — consultations to potential 
entrepreneurs — but only supported the 
launch of 50 actual ventures. ePIs did not try 
to select “winning” innovations or provide 
unmanaged venture capital. the program 
provided interest-free loans that resulted in 
self-selection by committed entrepreneurs. 
the nascent ventures had a limited time 
frame to hit specific product development or 
sales milestones. ePIs resources were focused 
on linking the entrepreneurs directly to 
customers or industry experts. rather than 
protect the innovations and ventures, ePIs 
encouraged knowledge-sharing across the 
ecosystem boundary, forcing the projects 
and ventures to develop, or fail, quickly. this 
allowed resources from “failed” projects to 
be recycled within the ecosystem, which is 
particularly important for the development 
of entrepreneurial ecosystems.
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contrasting national Models of ecosystem 
Development
International comparisons of regenmed 
activity are not obvious, because of 
significant disparities in funding 
mechanisms, regulatory frameworks, and 
national policies. the u.s., China, south 
Korea, Germany, and the u.K. are generally 
considered global leaders by total research, 
investment, and publication activity. 
although wide variation exists across these 
countries, all rely on varying mixes of 
government support funnelled primarily 
through university research projects. 
most ecosystems in the u.s. and european 
union (eu) have formed around research 
universities with significant federal and state 
funding for stem cell studies. Significant 
differences exist across those ecosystems. 
while venture capital has driven venture 
development in the u.s., government support 
has primarily played this role in the u.K. 
and Germany. China’s unique economic 
structures and relatively lax regulatory 
frameworks have enabled extensive 
clinical trial activity and, more recently, 
development partnering with western 
biopharma. south Korea has advanced stem 
cell research programs and arguably has the 
best-specified regulatory process, with three 
approved treatments on the market.
Japanese multinationals, fuelled by 
government support, are acquiring their way 
to a leading-edge ecosystem. fuji purchased 
Cellular Dynamics International (CDI), a 
world-leading stem cell venture spun out of 
the university of wisconsin-madison, for 
us$307 million. astellas Pharma recently 
purchased u.s.-based stem cell company 
Ocata therapeutics in a deal valued at us$379 
million. takara purchased Cellectis (sweden) 
and Clontech (u.s.) to bolster stem cell-related 
tools and development. reproCeLL acquired 
stemgent’s iPs business (u.s.), Biopta (u.K.), 
reinnervate (u.K.), and Bioserve (u.s.). 
an interesting contrast with Japan is found in 
Israel. Despite limited government support and 
modest university research programs, Israel 
has strong representation at international 
conferences and is fifth in the world for 
clinical trials. In 2014, the California Institute 
for regenerative medicine and matImOP 
(the Israel Industry Center for r&D) signed a 
collaborative research agreement specifically 
focusing on early clinical trials. Gamida Cell 
recently signed a us$35 million investment 
deal with novartis while Kadimastem signed 
a collaborative agreement with merck serono 
to advance research into neurodegenerative 
diseases.
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FURTHER 
RESOURCES
Conclusion: Culturing Healthy 
University Venturing Ecosystems
should university venture entrepreneurial 
ecosystems strive for the level of success 
observed at mIt and stanford? absolutely. But 
ecosystem evolution takes time, and simply 
copying “best practices” ignores critical 
differences in culture and entrepreneurial 
context. university and government 
policymakers need to build customized 
programs, systems, and policies to support 
those ecosystems, based on local strengths 
and stage of development. the hard truth is 
that copying elements from outlier successes 
is a bit like using a few specific ingredients 
from a complex recipe and hoping to cook the 
same dish.
It is useful to note the high-level perspective 
from one of the most successful institutions. 
Jon Sandelin, of Stanford’s Office of 
Technology Licensing, specifically noted in 
2005: “fourteen percent of the companies in 
which stanford has taken equity have failed... 
two [successful] companies generated more 
than 80% of the total amount of cashed-in 
equity… as is true for licensing in general, 
when licensing and supporting spin-outs, the 
focus should not be on how much income can 
be generated, but on the value flowing from 
a new partnering relationship… and on the 
public benefits from the products and services 
the spin-out may produce.”
Our research strongly supports this 
ecosystem-oriented perspective. Healthy 
entrepreneurial ecosystems at the u-I 
boundary depend on the university 
adopting a market-facing approach to 
venturing activity. a culture that encourages 
entrepreneurship but accepts failure provides 
the best context for knowledge collaboration 
across ecosystem boundaries. Policies that 
support the health of the ecosystem, rather 
than the success of specific innovations, are 
the most likely to generate long-term benefits.
Stem cell therapy 
developed: #HOV8125 in 
CIV’s History of Venture 
database
our research strongly 
supports this ecosystem-
oriented perspective
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